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Abstract
US policy toward Beijing has consistently been one of engagement since 
President Richard Nixon’s visit to the People’s Republic of China in 1972. There 
have been occasional swings in nuance, though, resulting from the positioning of 
four groups within the United States—pro-China commercial liberals, anti-China 
human-rights-oriented liberals, pro-China interdependence- and stability-focused 
realists, and anti-China military- and rivalry-focused realists—frustrating China 
and US allies in the region. In addition, US policy has been shaped by two distinct 
schools sharing the balance-of-power concept within the realist paradigm: one, 
which grew around Henry Kissinger, is optimistic about China’s future trajectory, 
while the other is skeptical. Despite the subtle but perceptible swings over the 
years, US leaders have managed to balance the various domestic interests and 
ideologies into a pragmatic and feasible policy, which has largely remained within 
the engagement paradigm. This paper examines whether or not US policy toward 
China is currently undergoing a structural change due to several key developments 
in recent years and the Obama administration’s evolving perceptions of China. 
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Introduction
In 2009 Barack Obama began his presidency with the “audacity of hope” that 
China would become a responsible stakeholder, cooperating with the United 
States on various global issues from climate change to post-Lehman financial and 
economic crisis management through the framework of a US-China “Group of 
4 The Journal of Contemporary China Studies, Vol.2, No. 2
Two.” By the following year, though, China’s assertiveness on territorial issues in 
the South and East China Sea and the harsh reaction to US arms sales to Taiwan 
dampened US optimism regarding China as a global partner. Despite mounting 
frustration, the Obama administration patiently maintained close bilateral 
communication, such as through the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, 
as part of its engagement policy toward China. 
Since President Richard Nixon’s surprise visit to the People’s Republic of China 
in 1972, the US policy toward Beijing has consistently been one of engagement, 
in sharp contrast to the antagonistic containment policy from 1947 to 1972 during 
the first half of the Cold War. 
That said, there have been subtle changes in the substance of the US 
engagement policy over the years. These occasional policy swings in the US 
government have frustrated China and US allies in the region. US journalist James 
Mann describes the occasional “about face” moments in US policy from the 
Nixon to the Bill Clinton administrations in his book, About Face.1 
For example, during the 1992 presidential campaign, Bill Clinton criticized 
President George H.W. Bush for irresponsibly extending most-favored-nation 
(MFN) status to China without considering the country’s human rights violations 
in the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. The Clinton camp proposed a linkage 
policy between improvements in human rights and MFN status. When he was 
elected president, however, Clinton ignored his campaign proposal and extended 
MFN status before there was any tangible improvement in the human rights 
situation. Clinton even called on Congress to grant China permanent MFN status 
in 2000 (the designation was renamed “permanent normal trade relations” in 
1998) without considering human rights, as the prosperous business and economic 
relations with China was contributing to a booming US economy. 
During the 2000 presidential campaign, George W. Bush criticized Clinton’s 
strategic partnership with China and proposed that the country be redefined as a 
strategic competitor.2 US-China relations deteriorated following the accidental 
collision between a US Navy EP-3E signals intelligence aircraft and a People’s 
Liberation Army Navy J-8II jet fighter near Hainan Island in April 2001. The 
terrorist attacks on September 11 of that year, though, restored the cooperative 
tone of US-China relations. In his visit to Beijing in February 2002, President 
Bush welcomed China’s cooperation on the global war on terror following 9/11.3
1 James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from 
Nixon to Clinton (New York: Vintage Books, 2000).
2 Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 
2000 (vol. 79, no. 1).
3 “President Bush Meets with Chinese President Jiang Zemin,” February 21, 2002, US 
Department of State Archive, http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2002/8564.htm (accessed 
5Despite such policy swings, all US administrations since 1972 have remained 
within the engagement paradigm. Initially, this paradigm was shaped by the 
Cold War dynamics of the global balance of power. In the post–Cold War period, 
though, China has emerged as a potential challenger to the regional and even 
global hegemony of the United States. In this context, the mutual interdependence 
of the US and Chinese economies has become a tool to justify the engagement 
paradigm as serving both economic and security interests. 
For Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, China was 
regarded as a positive game changer that could break the quagmire of the Vietnam 
War and the impasse in the Cold War against the Soviet Union. Hence, strategic 
cooperation with China was a crucial factor in the US Cold War strategy, enabling 
Washington to strike a balance with its strategic adversary between 1972 and 
1989. Kissinger himself pointed out that China no longer sought to constrain US 
power projection and started enlisting the United States as a counterweight against 
the Soviet Union.4 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many US security experts began to 
see China, with its growing power, as a potential rival to US regional and global 
hegemony, although Kissinger and his school retained their expectations that the 
US-China partnership would continue to grow. Two different schools thus shared 
the balance of power concept within the realist paradigm. Their differences were 
policy implications: While the Kissinger school was optimistic about China’s 
future trajectory, the other school was skeptical. 
A new dimension to the US engagement paradigm was added after the end 
of the Cold War in the face of rising economic and commercial expectations 
regarding the burgeoning Chinese economy. Now positioned as the second 
largest in the world, China’s rapidly growing economy has become essential 
for US businesses. Deepening US-China economic interdependence is regarded 
as a factor in preventing an eventual US-China hegemonic rivalry, and liberal 
politicians have come to endorse an engagement policy, rather than the realism 
they espoused during the Cold War. 
Schizophrenic tendencies in the US policy toward China can be seen in the 
shifting policy focus of US administrations, alternating between realism and 
liberalism. The US posture toward China has been affected by the positioning 
of various domestic actors, such as pro-China commercial liberals, anti-China 
human-rights-oriented liberals, pro-China interdependence- and stability-focused 
realists, and anti-China military- and rivalry-focused realists. 
Competition among the various policy schools became more visible and 
March 23, 2013).
4 Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin Press, 2011): 275–76.
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significant with each US presidential election cycle. Despite the policy swings 
and contradictory approaches, though, US leaders have managed to balance the 
various domestic interests and ideologies into pragmatic and feasible policies. 
In this sense, pragmatism has always been a dominant trait of US leaders, and 
US policy toward China since 1972 has, as a result, largely remained within the 
engagement policy paradigm despite vociferous arguments from both the left and 
right. At the same time, the pragmatic approach of US administrations has always 
provided a ready target for criticism from their political rivals.
Barack Obama is probably one of the most pragmatic presidents in US history. 
Unlike Clinton and Bush Jr., Obama began his administration without criticizing 
the China policy of his predecessor, although he did have harsh criticism for 
the decision to start the Iraq War. Over time, Obama’s China policy came to be 
shaped more by China’s assertiveness and uncooperative attitude toward global 
governance. Being a pragmatist, Obama shifted his China policy from one of 
cooperative engagement to cautious engagement in order to hedge against China’s 
military expansion and its assertive behavior toward its neighbors. 
Does Obama’s policy shift signal a historic transition from an engagement to 
a containment paradigm, with the United States perceiving drastic changes in 
the balance of power in the twenty-first century? Or is this just the latest of the 
periodic swings within the engagement paradigm that we have observed since 
1972? This paper examines whether or not US policy toward China is undergoing 
structural change by focusing on several key factors that have shaped the policy 
over the years. 
1. Four Different Policy Groups 
The apparent schizophrenia in US attitudes toward China can be explained 
by the existence of four distinct camps that have exerted an influence on US 
administrations. Winning a US presidential election requires candidates to secure 
the support of a broad array of constituents. One group may be critical of China’s 
human rights record, while another might seek stable business ties. The candidate 
must navigate carefully between the two different orientations, and, as a result, the 
policies they outline are often vague. 
The four major camps influencing the direction of US policy toward China 
are outlined in the Figure 1. The four blocs (A to D) are identified with regard to 
policy directions, particularly in security and trade. 
Group A represents the hawks who believe that hegemonic rivalry and military 
collision is likely, as a rising China increasingly poses a challenge to the United 
7States both regionally and globally. This group is not optimistic that China would 
become more democratic as its economic grows, and it is also skeptical about 
economic interdependence acting to stabilize the relationship and preventing 
conflicts. It thus advocates a confrontational security policy toward China 
bordering on containment.
A group called the Blue Team in the George W. Bush administration, for 
instance, adhered to an anti-China security policy. Many members were 
neoconservatives who advocated the use of US military power to promote 
democratization around the world. Blue Team members saw China’s Marxist, one-
party rule as a potential source of confrontation. And they did not expect China to 
democratize on its own as a natural outcome of economic growth.
Vice-President Richard Cheney was among the leading figures in this group. 
Princeton University Professor Aaron Friedberg, who served as Cheney’s 
national security advisor, provided theoretical support for the confrontational 
policy, arguing that China was a game changer for the international system.5 
Friedberg believed that China’s growing wealth and power would, if its one-party, 
authoritarian dictatorship was left intact, become a source of tension with the 
United States.6
In 2000, conservative, anti-China members of Congress created the US-
China Economic and Security Review Commission with a mandate “to monitor, 
investigate and submit to Congress an annual report on the national security 
implication of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United 
States and the People’s Republic of China, and to provide recommendations, 
where appropriate, to Congress for legislative and administrative action.”7 
In its annual report to Congress in 2012, the commission made 32 policy 
recommendations to the Obama administration, including a review of investments 
in the United States by Chinese state-owned and state-controlled companies, flows 
of military technology or data to China, and China’s cyber practices.8 
Group B represents those with moderate and pragmatic positions who advocate 
maintaining the engagement policy. Most policy practitioners since Nixon’s 1972 
5 Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for Mastery 
in Asia (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011).
6 Yoichi Kato, “Interview/Aaron Friedberg: More Balancing Needed than Engagement with 
China,” The Asahi Shimbun (September 13, 2012), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/opinion/
AJ201209130026 (searched date: March 24, 2013).
7 US-China Economic and Security Review Commission website, http://www.uscc.gov/ 
(searched date: March 24, 2013).
8 US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “2012 Report to Congress: Executive 
Summary and Recommendations,” November 2012, http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/
files/annual_reports/2012-Report-to-Congress-Executive%20Summary.pdf (searched date: 
March 24, 2013).
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visit to China belong to this group. Even within this camp, though, there are 
subtle differences in policy orientation. Those advocating soft engagement in such 
forms as a “sunshine policy” argue that economic cooperation would encourage 
China to be a benign and helpful partner in the security and political arenas. 
This position is close to group C, which emphasizes mutual economic interests 
and interdependence. On the other hand, the hard-line, “hawkish” engagement 
proponents attach importance to hedging against a potential military confrontation 
with China. This position is close to group A, with an emphasis on the hedge 
element. 
The softer position is championed by those viewing China as a stakeholder 
or envisioning a US-China G2. In general, they are optimistic about China’s 
cooperative attitude in the region and the world. Robert Zoellick, deputy secretary 
of state in the George W. Bush administration, advocated a “stakeholder” policy in 
a 2005 speech in which he said that China was unlike the Soviet Union of the late 
1940s in four ways. First, China does not seek to spread radical, anti-American 
ideologies. Second, China does not seek conflict against democracy, although it 
is not itself a democracy. Third, China is not opposed to capitalism. And fourth, 
China does not seek to overturn the fundamental order of the international system 
but rather believes that its success depends on being networked with the modern 
world.9 
Zbigniew Bzrezinski, former national security advisor to President Jimmy 
Carter who advanced the normalization process with China in 1979, was a notable 
advocate of the G2 position.
Bzrezinski was a strategic thinker in the realism school who saw a globally 
ascending China as a revisionist force for important changes in the international 
system. He felt that China would seek them in a patient, prudent, and peaceful 
manner and noted that Americans who deal with foreign affairs appreciate China’s 
“peaceful rising” in global influence while seeking a “harmonious world.”10 
Bzrezinski has influenced the Obama administration through his advice on foreign 
and security policy. 
Unlike Zoellick and Bzrezinski, the hawkish engagement position is skeptical 
of China’s self-described “peaceful rise.” For example, bureaucrats in the 
Department of Defense are concerned about China’s modernizing military and 
growing global economic influence. Unlike those in group A, they tend to be 
neutral about China’s Marxist ideology or one-party authoritarian rule. In other 
9 Robert Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” Remarks to the 
National Committee on US-China Relations, September 21, 2005 at http://2001-2009.state.
gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm (searched date: March 24, 2013).
10 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Group of Two that Could Change the World,” Financial Times, 
January 13, 2009.
9words, they do not necessarily believe that military confrontation with China 
is inevitable. But at the same time, they do not share the notion that economic 
interdependence in itself would help prevent military confrontation. Andrew 
Marshall, who has continued to serve as director of the Department of Defense’s 
Office of Net Assessment since being appointed by President Nixon in 1973, is 
one of the leading hawk engagers in this group. His perceptions of China can be 
gleaned from various Department of Defense reports, including the 2012 annual 
report to Congress. The report observes that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
pursues a long-term, comprehensive military modernization program to win 
“local wars under conditions of informatization,” or high-intensity, information-
centric regional military operations of short duration. On the other hand, the 
report says that Chinese leaders seek to maintain peace and stability along their 
country’s periphery to secure access to markets, capital, and resources and avoid 
direct confrontation with the United States and others. The report recommends 
strengthening the US-China military-to-military relationship by encouraging it 
to cooperate with the United States and others through cooperative practices to 
secure access to international public goods through counter-piracy or international 
peacekeeping operations.11 These two different approaches to the rise of China 
within the B camp will be discussed in the following section. 
Those in the C group espouse a more optimistic view that deepening economic 
ties would prompt China to become a more cooperative actor in the region and 
the world. They have less concern about China’s rapid military expansion and 
modernization resulting from accumulating wealth. They represent the economic 
interests of industry and business that stand to reap benefits from enhanced trade 
and investment. They tend to be quiet about advocating their positions, though, 
because they are wary of being criticized for their “greedy” pursuit of business 
interests or ignorance of US national interests and China’s human rights record. As 
the result, few government officials openly take this position. However, advocates 
exert considerable influence among both Republican and Democratic party leaders 
and administrations through their financial donations. 
Henry Paulson, who was treasury secretary in the George W. Bush 
administration, is one of the group’s few visible policy advocates. He built a close 
network with Chinese counterparts during a financial career at Goldman Sachs 
and was a founding member of the US-China Strategic Economic Dialogue, 
which was upgraded to US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in 2009. 
As treasury secretary, Paulson believed that robust and sustained economic 
11 Office of the US Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security 
Developments involving the People’s Republic of China 2012, May 2012 at http://www.
defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2012_CMPR_Final.pdf (searched date: March 24, 2013).
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growth was a social imperative for China and that Chinese leaders viewed the 
country’s international relations primarily through an economic lens. Paulson thus 
proposed approaching China through economic interests as “an effective way to 
produce tangible results in both economic and noneconomic areas.” While noting 
that some people were recommending containment, Paulson clearly stated that 
engagement was “the only path to success.”12 
Those in group D represent the liberal Democratic in Congress who are 
concerned about promoting human rights and protecting American jobs in the 
face of China’s currency manipulation and closed market. Human rights watchers 
include former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, who early in her congressional 
career worked to protect Chinese students in the United States in the wake of 
the Tiananmen Square incident. She co-sponsored and helped pass legislation to 
extend the length of stay of the students, who could have been arrested once back 
in China for their support of the 1989 pro-democracy movement. Pelosi continued 
to promote actions against human rights violations even while serving as House 
speaker and currently House minority leader. On her website, Pelosi states, “in 
China and Tibet, people are languishing in prisons for only expressing their ideas 
and political views.” She adds that Nobel Peace Prize recipient Liu Xiaobo, who 
called for an online petition to promote human rights and democracy, is still in 
prison and argues, “If we don’t stand up for human rights in China and Tibet 
then we lose our moral authority to speak out for human rights in the rest of the 
world.”13
The trade protectionist wing within group D is represented by Senator Chuck 
Schumer. He has sponsored many retaliatory bills against China, such as higher 
tariffs in response to “currency manipulation,” which is blamed for eating into 
US domestic employment. For example, Schumer co-sponsored the Currency 
Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2011 to impose tariffs on imports from 
countries with undervalued currencies. Although the bill was approved by the 
Senate on 11 October 2011, it was rejected by the House. 
On his website, Schumer takes a negative view of China’s participation in 
the WTO, which was expected to bring China’s policy in line with global trade 
rules. Instead, he claims, China has used those rules to spur its own economic 
growth and expand exports at the expense of its trading partners, including the 
United States. He also criticizes “China’s overt and continuous manipulation of its 
currency to gain a trade advantage over its trading partners.”14 
12 Henry Paulson, “A Strategic Economic Engagement: Strengthening US-China Ties,” 
Foreign Affairs, September/October 2008.
13 Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi’s website, http://pelosi.house.gov/special-issues/human-
rights.shtml (searched date: March 24, 2013).
14 Senator Charles E. Schumer’s website, http://www.schumer.senate.gov/Issues/trade.htm 
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D group members cooperate with group A Republicans on human rights 
and trade issues at the congressional US-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission. In fact, the commission’s chair has alternated between 
representatives of the two groups. For example, the current chairman during 
the reporting cycle through December 2013 is William Reinsch, a Democrat 
who served as legislative assistant to Senator John Rockefeller. The current 
vice-chairman and former chairman is Dennis C. Shea, who served as assistant 
secretary in the Department of Housing and Urban Development during 
Republican George W. Bush’s administration.15 
U.S. Four Policy Groups Toward Rise of China
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Figure 1: Two Influential Schools in the Realism Tradition
Source: the Author
The US engagement policy toward China since 1972 has been conducted 
mainly by realists in both Republican and Democrat administrations. In 1972, 
President Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, led a drastic 
policy paradigm shift from the confrontational containment policy of previous 
administrations to one seeking cooperation with China. It also represented a shift 
(searched date: March 24, 2013).
15 US-China Economic and Security Review Commission website, note 7. 
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from an ideology-oriented containment policy against the Communist bloc as a 
whole toward a calculated engagement policy based on balance-of-power realism. 
Nixon understood the necessity of cooperating with China to influence the 
balance of the power in favor of the US strategic position against the Soviet 
challenge, in spite of ideological differences with China. Ironically, China’s 
Marxist ideology was more radical than that of the Soviet Union. In fact, China 
criticized the Soviet position as revisionist and for straying from Marxist ideals. 
Nixon set aside ideology and focused instead on the geopolitical conflict between 
the two Marxist states. 
The rationale behind the decision to reach reconciliation with China, though, 
was not a simple one. As a matter of the fact, the administration was also seeking 
to ease tensions with the Soviet Union,16 and its realism had a highly pragmatic 
quality. Nixon expected both China and the Soviet Union to play a cooperative 
role to end the quagmire in Vietnam—a war that had seriously exhausted the US 
economy and society. 
With the 1972 visit to China, Nixon and Kissinger initiated a shift from an 
ideology-led containment policy paradigm to a pragmatism-led engagement policy 
paradigm. US policy toward China has since remained within the engagement 
paradigm, although there have been occasional subtle swings. Political interaction 
among the various interest groups has been one cause for these swings. 
Another factor has been the existence of two schools within the US 
policymaking community, including government officials, namely, the “Kissinger 
school” and the “Marshall school.” Interaction between these two schools, with 
different approaches to China, has played a critical role in shaping US policy 
toward China. The two groups are named after legendary foreign and security 
policy “gurus,” the first being Henry Kissinger, national security advisor in the 
Nixon administration and secretary of the state in the Gerald Ford administration, 
who has continued to exert an influence on presidents and State Department 
foreign policy experts to this day. Although he has not held any official positions 
since the Ford administration, such protégés as Brent Scowcroft—national security 
advisor for George H.W. Bush—have played important roles in government and 
academia. 
Andrew Marshall, meanwhile, has served as director of the Office of Net 
Assessment in the Department of the Defense since 1973. He has had considerable 
influence over secretaries of defense and Pentagon experts over the years, 
although he is not as well known to the public as Kissinger. 
16 Michael Schaller, “Drinking Your Mao Tai and Having Your Vodka, Too,” in Robert S. 
Ross and Jian Changbin, eds., Re-examing the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001), Chapter 12, 362–63. 
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The two schools have different approaches to China, although they share a 
geopolitical realism and an engagement paradigm.
Comparing the two schools, Kissinger is closer to the “business promotion” 
orientation of group C, while Marshall is closer to the “containment/confrontation” 
policy of group A in the Figure 1. For example, the Kissinger school tends to 
focus on security reassurances and on keeping communication channels open. On 
the other hand, the Marshall school tends to focus on balancing and hedging in the 
security domain against China’s military expansion and potential confrontational 
posture. 
Brent Scowcroft summed up the Kissinger school’s view of China as follows: 
They [China] depend on our market, and we depend on them to buy bonds 
so that we can run these big deficits. So there is growing interdependence. . . . 
If we treat them like an enemy, they will [become an enemy]. We can’t make 
them a friend. But, I don’t see anything that would lead me to conclude that 
inevitable conflict/confrontation is out there.17
On the other hand, Andrew Marshall himself pointed out that there are two 
dimensions to Washington’s China policy, engagement and risk hedge: 
The hope [of an engagement policy] is that this will lead, ultimately, to a 
more democratic and normal power. We don’t know that that’s the way it will 
actually end up, and so we have to hedge against [the possibility of this] not 
turning out quite so well.18 
These two schools have shaped the policy directions of the US engagement 
policy paradigm. For example, in the 1970s the Ford administration gradually 
and quietly increased its military and intelligence cooperation with China against 
the Soviet Union. This can be interpreted as a result of interaction between the 
two schools. Kissinger subsequently tried to promote military and intelligence 
cooperation with China as a substitute for his unfinished promise, made on his 
1972 visit, to normalize relations with China.19 Normalization talks had stagnated 
due to domestic opposition among pro-Taiwan members of Congress and the 
politically weakened Republican administrations, set back by the Watergate 
scandal and the resignation of President Nixon. 
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger in the Ford administration agreed with 
17 Hiroyuki Akita, “U.S.-China Relations and Management of the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” USJP 
Occasional Paper 07-01, Program on U.S.-Japan Relations, Harvard University, 2007, 15.
18 Ibid., 10.
19 James Mann, About Face, 53–77.
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Kissinger’s idea of proceeding with military and intelligence cooperation with a 
different rationale; he adhered to the idea of using the “China card” against the 
Soviet Union. As a young researcher at RAND Corporation, Michael Pillsbury 
wrote a secret “China card” memo to the Pentagon noting that military cooperation 
with China would induce the Soviet Union to reduce its military forces on the 
European front in order to deal with Chinese forces along its southern border.20 
Secretary Schlesinger eagerly embraced the China card option, since confrontation 
with the Soviet Union in Europe was a critical issues for US security policy at 
the time. Pillsbury had worked under Andrew Marshall at the RAND Corporation 
before Marshall joined the Pentagon. 
During the Cold War era, both schools favored strategic cooperation with China 
as a realistic hedge against the Soviet Union. After China emerged as a potential 
geopolitical rival to the United States, however, the two schools sometimes took 
different positions within the engagement paradigm. 
Both schools were represented in the Georg W. Bush administration, as in 
earlier administrations. Kissinger himself regularly advised President Bush and 
Vice President Cheney.21 Bush eventually took a cooperative stance toward China, 
regarding the country as a partner in the war on terror, despite initially labeling it a 
strategic competitor. Clearly, the priority for the Bush administration was the fight 
against terrorism following 9/11. 
The Defense Department, though, has quietly started viewing China as a 
potential challenger to US regional and global hegemony. For example, the DOD’s 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2006 described China, along with Russia, as 
a country at a strategic crossroads. The report states that “China has the greatest 
potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military 
technologies that could over time off set traditional US military advantages absent 
US counter strategies.”22 At that moment, though, it was not clear whether China 
had the capability and intention to emerge as a threat to the US hegemony. The 
report’s wording emphasized a cooperative, engagement rhetoric, noting, “The 
United States’ goal is for China to continue as an economic partner and emerge 
as a responsible stakeholder and force for good in the world.”23 At the same time, 
there were clear elements of a hedge policy: “Shaping the choices of major and 
emerging powers requires a balanced approach, one that seeks cooperation but 
also creates prudent hedges against the possibility that cooperative approaches by 
themselves may fail to preclude future conflict.” Such ideas suggest Marshall’s 
20 Michael Pillsbury, “US-China Military Ties?” Foreign Policy, Autumn 1975.
21 Bob Woodward, “State of Denial,” Washington Post, October 1, 2006.
22 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, 29. at 




In fact, the principle author of QDR 2006 was then Special Assistant to Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Jim Thomas. He later joined the Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) as vice president and director of studies. CSBA 
Founder and President Andrew Krepinevich is regarded as one of the most 
prominent students of Andrew Marshal.24 For Thomas, the challenge was how to 
sustain US military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific over the long term at a time 
of severe fiscal restraints on military spending. He expected Japan to share the 
burden of counterbalancing China’s naval strength in the air-sea battle scenario, 
cooperating within the framework of the Japan-US alliance.25
Since the 1970s, two streams within the realist school have influenced US 
policy toward China. The dynamic interplay between these two groups has been 
an important element in shaping US strategic thinking toward China. 
2. From the G2 Euphoria to the Asia Pivot
There has been a perceptible change in the Obama administration’s policy 
during the first four years of the president’s tenure. Jeffrey Bader, who served 
senior director for East Asian affairs on the National Security Council, recalls 
in his memoirs that the Obama administration’s basic stance toward China has 
not changed, suggesting that the media has depicted the nuanced changes in the 
Obama administration’s position in an exaggerated manner.26 Indeed, there has 
been no shift in the engagement policy paradigm, and in this sense, Bader’s claim 
is legitimate. But at the same time, there has been a clear change in nuance, from 
the early cooperative engagement posture built on “strategic reassurances” and 
expectations of a US-China G2 to the more recent hedging and balancing, marked 
by such rhetoric as “pivot to Asia” or “rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific” 
stressing a more fully engaged US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. 
This change was undoubtedly a reaction to a series of assertive actions and 
rhetoric of Chinese government officials, especially high ranking officers of the 
People’s Liberation Army. It is important to take note of how Chinese actions and 
US perceptions of them have influenced the standing of various China experts 
24 Hiroyuki Akita, Anryu (Silent Stream), (Tokyo: Nikkei Publishing, 2008): 41–42. 
25 Jan Van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas, Air Sea Battle: A 
Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 
2010.
26 Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China’s Rise (Washington, DC: Brooking Institution Press, 
2012), 80–82. 
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within the Obama administration. 
Obama initially expected China to emerge as a potential partner in dealing 
with the many global issues in the international arena, reflecting foreign policy 
advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski’s G2 expectations. Brzezinski contributed an article 
on informal G2 cooperation between the United States and China for global 
governance to the Financial Times in January 2009.27
And in a speech in October 2009, Deputy Secretary of the State James 
Steinberg proposed a “strategic reassurance policy” toward China:
Strategic reassurance rests on a core, if tacit, bargain. Just as we and our allies 
must make clear that we are prepared to welcome China’s “arrival,” as you all 
have so nicely put it, as a prosperous and successful power, China must reassure 
the rest of the world that its development and growing global role will not come 
at the expense of security and well-being of others. Bolstering that bargain 
must be a priority in the US-China relationship. And strategic reassurance 
must find ways to highlight and reinforce the areas of common interest, while 
addressing the sources of mistrust directly, whether they be political, military, 
or economic.28
Steinberg’s idea is based on expectations that China would take responsibility 
for solving global political and economic issues if the United States reassured 
China’s position as a global power. This was the foreign policy tone of the 
Obama administration in early 2009. The administration felt that the United 
States alone would be unable to deal with all global issues in the light of the Bush 
administration’s failed unilateral approach and the heavy burden of engagement in 
two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Such naïve expectations of China’s cooperation were, however, quickly 
betrayed by China’s assertive actions and the harsh rhetoric of PLA officials in 
2010. Omens of a negative Chinese reaction toward G2 expectations were China’s 
uncooperative attitude at the COP15 climate change meeting in Copenhagen in 
December 2009. The Obama administration expected China, as a potential US 
partner, to help shape the post–Kyoto Protocol framework to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions. Neither the United States nor China were signatories to the Kyoto 
Protocol, despite being the world’s two largest CO2 emitters. Since China had an 
influential position over developing countries, which were opposed to the position 
of the developed countries, US-China cooperation had the potential to produce a 
27 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Group of Two that Could Change the World,” Financial Times, 
January 13, 2009.
28 James Steinberg, keynote address on “China’s Arrival: The Long March to Global Power” at 
the Center for a New American Security, September 24, 2009.
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general agreement. President Obama believed that China should not be imposed 
the same level of emission reduction requirements as developed countries, while 
European countries believed China should.29 The conference produced some 
results, thanks to President Obama’s efforts and his persuasive rhetoric.30 But 
China’s uncooperative attitude at COP15 was a source of disappointment and 
worry for administration officials. 
In January 2010, moreover, China reacted harshly to the administration’s 
decision to sell $6.4 billion in military equipment to Taiwan, and it unilaterally 
suspended all military exchange with the United States. The reaction was stronger 
than expected, despite the fact that the deal did not include such crucial offensive 
weapons as F-16 C/D jet fighters. President Obama was also puzzled by the 
unusually strong reaction to his meeting with the Dalai Lama, an exile from 
China-controlled Tibet, the following month. 
In March, the South Korean Navy’s corvette, ROKS Cheonan, was sunk by 
a North Korean miniature submarine. To deter further North Korean military 
aggression, the US and South Korean Navies conducted joint exercises in the 
Yellow Sea. PLA leaders, including Deputy Chief of Staff General Mao Xiaotian 
expressed strong opposition to the exercises in the media.31 
In addition, the PLA Navy’s East Sea Fleet conducted military exercises in 
the East China Sea, and its missile destroyer and frigate cruised along the high 
seas between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island near US military bases in July. 
Meanwhile, tensions rose owing to territorial disputes in the South China Sea 
between China and Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia.
At the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi on July 23 2010, Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton stated, “the United States, like every nation, has a national interest 
in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect 
for international law in the South China Sea.”32 This apparently offended China, 
which conducted large naval exercises in the South China Sea after the meeting.
A series of events caused a further deterioration in US-China relations. Chinese 
President Hu Jintao’s scheduled visit to the United States in September was 
postponed to January 2011. In its annual report to Congress, submitted on August 
16 2010, the US Department of Defense noted that the PLA Navy was seeking to 
enhance its strength in order to gain an upper hand in disputes in the East China 
Sea and South China Sea, that China may start work on building its own aircraft 
29 Jeffrey Bader, Obama and China’s Rise, p. 62.
30 Ibid., p. 68.
31 Elizabeth Bumiller and Edward Wong, “China Warily Eyes U.S.-Korea Drills,” New York 
Times, July 20, 2010.
32 Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks to the ASEAN Regional Forum,” July 12, 2010. at 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/07/194987.htm(searched date: May 26, 2013)
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carrier within the year, and that despite improving relations with Taiwan, it had not 
reduced the size of the military force poised against it. In response, on August 18, 
the Chinese Ministry of Defense criticized the report, saying that it “has no basis 
in objective fact” and would be “an obstacle to the improvement and development 
of military relations between the US and China.”33
Earlier, the Department of Defense clearly indicated it was advancing a hedging 
policy against potential Chinese assertions in its 2010 Quadrennial Defense 
Review, released in February 2010.
The report stated that the two biggest security challenges in East Asia are 
dealing with North Korea’s continuing nuclear weapons development program 
and addressing the rise of China and its growing global influence. It confirmed its 
engagement stance by stating that rather than treating China as an enemy requiring 
“containment,” the “United States welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful 
China that plays a greater global role.”
However, it simultaneously illustrated US intentions to hedge against Chinese 
military expansion, stating, “Lack of transparency and the nature of China’s 
military development and decision-making processes raise legitimate questions 
about its future conduct and intentions within Asia and beyond.”34
QDR 2010 specifically warns of the denial of US and allied military access by 
Chinese forces—as the result of continued modernization—to areas of potential 
conflict, such as the seas around Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the East China 
Sea. The report refers to this kind of capability as anti-access/area-denial (A2/
AD): “Anti-access strategies seek to deny outside countries the ability to project 
power into a region, thereby allowing aggression or other destabilizing actions 
to be conducted by the anti-access power.” The fear is that “Without dominant 
U.S. capabilities to project power, the integrity of U.S. alliances and security 
partnerships could be called into question, reducing U.S. security and influence 
and increasing the possibility of conflict.”35
China’s assertive posture in regional security and stability eventually convinced 
the Department of Defense, along with many in the State Department, that more 
hedging is necessary to shape China’s course along a peaceful trajectory. Among 
the major shapers of this policy course were Secretary of the State Hillary Clinton 
and Assistant Secretary of the State for Asia-Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell. 
33 “Chugoku Bei gunjihokoku ni hanpatsu: Kankei hatten no samatage, koryu saikai 
muzukashiku” (China Criticizes US Military Report as Impediment to Closer Relations: 
Resumption of Exchange Now Difficult), Nikkei website, August 18, 2010, at http://www.
nikkei.com/article/DGXNASGM18038_Y0A810C1FF1000/ (searched date: April 1, 2013).
34 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, p. 60. at 
http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf
35 Ibid., p 31.
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In fact, Kurt Campbell was deputy assistant secretary for Asia-Pacific affairs 
in the Department of Defense in the Bill Clinton administration. The hedging-
oriented QDR 2010 was supervised by Undersecretary of Defense for Policy 
Michele Flournoy, who co-founded the think tank, Center for a New American 
Security (CNAS), with Campbell.
Despite of nuanced differences in wording, both Secretary of State Clinton 
and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta have released policy papers and made 
speeches to the effect that Washington will refocus its security, foreign, and 
economic policy toward the Asia-Pacific region. The policy shift has been called 
a “pivot to Asia” or a “rebalancing toward the Asia–Pacific.” The policy direction 
was reaffirmed with President Obama’s remarks at the Pentagon and the release 
of new strategic guidelines for US defense policy, “Sustaining U.S. Global 
Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” in January 2012. The report 
clearly confirmed the priority being given to the US military presence in the Asia-
Pacific region despite limited defense resources.36 
3. Obama’s Policy Shift and Future Directions
There are three main elements in Washington’s engagement policy paradigm 
toward China. The first is “cooperative engagement,” which means building and 
maintaining economic and diplomatic ties with China. The second is “balancing,” 
which means creating a favorable balance of power surrounding China to affect 
its behavior. The third is “hedging,” which means maintaining a regional military 
presence and closer alliance management in case China emerges as a challenger to 
US hegemony. 
Looking at the transformation of the Obama administration’s China policy from 
its early optimism to cautious engagement, one can say that there has been a shift 
away from cooperative engagement and toward balancing and hedging. Balancing 
is found in the pivot/rebalancing, which is an attempt to reassure China’s 
neighbors that the US military presence will continue. It also tries to shape China’s 
choices toward benign and cooperative options. A hedging element, meanwhile, 
is found in Obama’s November 2011 announcement of the deployment of Marine 
Corps personnel to Darwin, Australia, which is closer to the South China Sea, as 
well as a series of statements aimed at maintaining closer ties with such regional 
36 Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century 
Defense, January 2012. at http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.
pdf(searched date: May 26, 2013)
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allies as Japan and South Korea. 
A series of assertive Chinese moves apparently stimulated the ”early warning 
sensors” of US policy planners, who believe in the importance of balancing and 
hedging against China’s military expansion. 
Jeff Bader, who actually conducted the White House’s China policy as a senior 
director for Asian affairs of the National Security Council, points out that “China’s 
incautious and gratuitously assertive diplomacy and action had alienated most of 
its neighbors, notably Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, and India.” Since 
one element of Obama’s Asia strategy was to ensure that China’s rise contributed 
to regional stability rather than instability, Obama’s national security team felt that 
China’s neighbors would welcome a US presence and forward deployment.37 This 
description is the rationale behind the US pivot/rebalancing policy of 2010–11. 
Aaron Friedberg, who advocates a more hawkish engagement than Bader, 
made a similar but blunt observation on Obama’s policy change. Friedberg shared 
Bader’s view that Chinese assertions have caused a great deal of anxiety among 
Japan, South Korea, the smaller countries of Southeast Asia, and India. “The 
Obama administration, starting in 2010, really began to change direction. They 
didn’t abandon engagement, but placed a lot more emphasis on the balancing part 
of the long-standing US strategy.”38 
Interestingly, within the Obama administration, such a policy shift was 
conducted smoothly without any apparent policy conflict or personnel changes. 
That is characteristics of the engagement policy paradigm. Even among the 
two different realist factions in the administrations, the three elements of the 
engagement policy were embedded in their policy calculation. 
Initially, the Kissinger school’s traditional stance with a more cooperative, 
engagement-oriented “security reassurance” policy was spearheaded by Deputy 
Secretary of the State James Steinberg and the National Security Council’s Senior 
Director of East Asian Affairs Jeffry Bader. Zbigniew Brzezinski had a strong 
influence in shaping the ideas held by senior administration officials and President 
Obama.
After seeing China’s assertive behavior, though, a more cautious engagement 
policy advocated by the Department of Defense, Secretary of State Clinton, and 
Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell has come to the fore. Their approach is 
more within the Marshall school tradition. Again, such a policy change was made 
smoothly without apparent conflict in the administration. All actors in the Obama 
administration seemed to understand that shifting emphasis on different elements 
within the paradigm was necessary and effective in positively shaping China’s 
37 Jeff Bader, Obama and China’s Rise, 109.
38 Yoichi Kato, “Aaron Friedberg Interview.”
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choices. 
Obama’s policy change has not been as dynamic as in past administrations, 
which saw open conflict among the main actors—both inside and outside the 
administration—associated with four separate groups, as outlined in the Figure 1. 
Obama’s policy shift has simply been a nuanced change within group B.
This suggests that US policy toward China will stay within the engagement 
policy paradigm despite the turmoil in bilateral relations in 2010. In 2011, military 
exchange had resumed, and channels of communication remained open. In fact, 
military exchange between the United States and China have continued even in the 
face of deteriorating ties with Japan over the Senkaku Islands and the escalation 
of tensions in the South China Sea in 2011 and 2012.
In May 2012, Beijing hosted the second US-China Strategic Security Dialogue, 
jointly chaired by US Deputy Secretary of State William Burns and Chinese Vice 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Zhijun and attended by Acting Under-Secretary 
of Defense James Miller, Commander-in-Chief Samuel J. Locklear of the US 
Pacific Command, and Ma Xiaotian, deputy chief of the General Staff of the PLA.
During the same month, Chinese Minister of Defense Liang Guanglie visited 
the United States and met with a number of top US defense officials, including 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen, Secretary of Defense 
Panetta, and National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon. Accompanied by 
personnel from the Chinese Army, Navy, and Air Force, Liang toured military 
installations nationwide. PLA Deputy Chief of Staff Cai Yingting also visited the 
United States in late August, even as tensions ran high in the South China Sea and 
around the Senkaku Islands.
This is proof that Obama’s policy shift does not indicate a reversal from 
engagement to hostile containment, as contended by some Chinese officials, who 
criticize America’s Cold War thinking. If any administration truly tried to move 
toward a containment paradigm, there would be an enormous, negative impact 
on US businesses and the economy, as well as strong political backlash from 
Congress and industry. 
During the 2012 presidential election, Republican challenger Mitt Romney 
made no reference to a shift toward a hostility or containment paradigm, although 
he criticized China as a currency manipulator. This implies that even conservatives 
do not seek to contain China and rather see China as an economic partner into the 
foreseeable future. 
The future trajectory of US policy toward China’s rise beyond the Obama 
administration is very difficult to predict. China’s international behavior is an 
important element that will shape this policy. At the same time, we need to keep an 
eye on the interaction among not only policy subgroups within US administrations 
but also domestic political groups. As long as China’s assertiveness and show 
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of strength are well balanced with US economic interests, US policy is likely 
to stay within the engagement paradigm for the foreseeable future. At the same 
time, it would be very difficult for China to pursue a modest foreign policy 
because the new political leadership in China needs to address growing domestic 
contradictions and frustrations in a rapid growing society. As the result, US 
policy toward China will no doubt continue to occasionally stress the hedging 
and hawkish elements within the engagement paradigm. Although US policy 
toward China appears to swing, the range of policy options are limited. A more 
drastic paradigm shift in US policy would result only in the light of more dynamic 
changes in the balance of power between China, on the one hand, and the United 
States and its allies, on the other. 
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